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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the degree of risk aversion exhibited by Irish fund 
managers. Assuming a mean-variance optimising manager, we employ the 
dynamic conditional correlation specification (Engle, 2002) of the multivariate 
GARCH model to estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion. We find that 
fund managers whose remit is to “aggressively” manage their portfolios have 
coefficients lying between 1.69 and 2.42, while the risk aversion parameter of 
“balanced” managed funds range from 3.24 to 3.69. Finally we discuss the 
implications of these numbers on the likelihood of these managers partaking in 
risky investments.  
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JEL Classification: G11, G15, C32, G20. I. Introduction 
Risk aversion is a central tenet in financial economics. However, the 
debate as to the magnitude of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
is one that has long been to the forefront of the field and the economics of 
uncertainty in general. In simulating many of the popular models in finance, 
the coefficient of risk aversion is a free parameter that requires calibration. In 
their famed paper on the ‘equity premium puzzle’, Mehra and Prescott (1985) 
argue that values greater than 10 are implausibly large. Both Mankiw and 
Zeldes (1991) and Lucas (1994) state that even 10 is an extreme case, with 
Lucas arguing that any ‘solution’ to the equity premium puzzle that relies on a 
CRRA greater than 2.5 is unlikely to be broadly accepted. 
Since the early 1970s, research on the CRRA has spawned a voluminous 
literature. In his seminal work, Arrow (1971) argued that due to the bounding 
conditions of the utility function, the coefficient should be close to unity. Ever 
since, there have been numerous studies, spanning different fields of 
economics providing estimates of this parameter and values needed to match 
the data in simulated models.  
 Friend and Blume (1975) use information on asset holdings, income and 
other demographics for a large cross-section of households and conclude that 
the CRRA is greater than unity and “is more likely to be in excess of two”. 
Generally, estimates from finance applications tend to be large. An exception 
is Hansen and Singleton (1982) who report estimates between 0.35 and 1. 
However, Mehra and Prescott (1985) require the CRRA to be in excess of 10 
(and may be as high as 50) to reconcile the large premium paid by equity with 
theoretical models. Szpiro (1986) using data from insurance markets finds 
  1support for constant relative risk aversion with a coefficient between 1.2 and 
1.8. However, Blake (1996) finds estimates vary with wealth level, with the 
poorest and richest groups exhibiting CRRA of 47.60 and 7.88 respectively. 
Clare et al. (1998) investigate the appropriateness of the CAPM for the UK 
market and fail to reject a CRRA of 2, an often-hypothesised value in 
calibrated models. More recently, Aït-Sahalia and Lo (2000) provide estimates 
of CRRA using option-pricing models and find estimates ranging from 1 to 
60, with a weighted average of 12.7.  
In testing the CAPM, Engel and Rodrigues (1989), Giovannini and Jorion 
(1990) and Thomas and Wickens (1993) generate estimates of the CRRA. 
However these are generally highly implausible, often negative for a static 
covariance matrix and not statistically significantly different from zero for 
time-varying specifications of the conditional covariance matrix. 
Our paper sheds new light on the issue by focusing exclusively on 
estimating the CRRA. We use a simple mean-variance framework and show 
that by fully covering the range of assets in a typical portfolio and employing 
time-varying covariance matrices as risk measures, even such a simple model 
can provide estimates of CRRA that are consistent with theoretical values. 
Previously, estimation of time-varying covariance matrices for a broad range 
of assets proved difficult but here we adopt the highly flexible dynamic 
conditional correlation (DCC) specification of the multivariate GARCH model 
due to Engle (2002). This allows us to capture changes in the investment 
opportunity set and assess the reaction of portfolio managers.  
Our approach is closest in spirit to Thomas and Wickens (1993), Engle and 
Rodrigues (1989) and Giovannini and Jorion (1989), but differs in a number of 
  2important aspects that are likely to influence the parameter of interest in our 
analysis. Firstly, our paper is the only one to focus exclusively on estimating 
the coefficient of risk aversion. The others concentrate on tests of the CAPM 
with the CRRA being a by-product rather than the focus of the test. Secondly, 
we use the actual weights employed by portfolio managers as opposed to the 
CAPM weights. Therefore we are not imposing any restrictions on the 
portfolio allocations. Given that observed asset weights differ substantially 
from those implied by the CAPM, our analysis represents actual financial 
market behaviour and hence should provide a better of estimate of risk 
aversion amongst fund managers. The CRRA from the other studies indicates 
the degree of risk aversion required for the CAPM to hold rather than that 
displayed by market participants. Thirdly, employing the highly flexible DCC 
version of the multivariate GARCH model allows us to increase the asset 
coverage in the analysis. Other studies constrain their asset coverage to 
include only the largest markets. While this is a legitimate approach, the 
portfolio effects of the smaller and often less correlated markets are inevitably 
omitted. In our model, the attractiveness of such markets is captured through 
the (time-varying) covariance terms. The decision of the fund manager as to 
whether or not to invest in such assets can be quite revealing as to their 
attitudes to risk. 
 We focus on two classes of funds; aggressively managed and balanced 
managed funds. Both undertake significant international diversification and 
are therefore most consistent with theoretical models. Irish funds are worthy 
of attention for a number of reasons. Firstly, the domestic equity market is 
small, accounting for less than 1% of world market capitalisation, making 
  3international investment a necessary vehicle for portfolio choice. Secondly, 
Ireland’s tradition and culture mean that agents may be more familiar with 
foreign markets and less prone to overstating the risk of foreign assets. 
Assuming that fund managers are mean-variance optimisers, we estimate their 
implied CRRA. Our results show that aggressively managed funds exhibit 
lower risk aversion with CRRA estimates ranging from 1.69 to 2.42. Balanced 
managed funds typically hold more riskless assets and consequently, CRRA 
estimates vary between 3.21 and 3.78. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows; section 2 outlines the 
mean-variance framework on which our estimations are based. Section 3 
discusses the econometric model and the data employed. Section 4 presents 
our results and discusses their implications while Section 5 contains our 
concluding remarks. 
 
II. Mean-variance  framework 
We assume that fund managers adopt a simple mean-variance framework
1 (as 
in Engel and Rodrigues, 1989; Giovannini and Jorion, 1990; Thomas and 
Wickens, 1993) to allocate funds among various asset classes. This is consistent 
with myopic investment and a single period model such as the CAPM.  Even in a 
multi-period setting, Shleifer and Vishney (1997) argue that fund managers can be 
motivated to take a myopic view in their investing strategies if less sophisticated 
investors use short-term returns to evaluate their performance or competence. 
Hence we argue that our assumed framework is justified. We have a 
representative manager who seeks to maximise end-of-period real wealth, given 
information available at the beginning of the period. 
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xt, rt+1 and i are n-vectors of portfolio asset weights, asset returns and ones 
respectively. The risk free rate is denoted by rf. Vt(rt+1) refers to the conditional 
variance-covariance matrix of asset returns. The excess return on the portfolio 
between t and t+1 is given by; 
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Substituting Eqs. (2) and (3) into (1) and maximising with respect to xt gives 
the first order conditions: 
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Defining the coefficient of relative risk aversion,  t t W
U
U
1
2 2 − = ρ , and re-
arranging the above expression, we get the following condition; 
t t t t f t t x r V r r E ) ( ) ( 1 1 + + = − ρ     (6) 
Assuming that agents are rational, we get the equation that we want to 
estimate: 
. ) ( 1 1 1 + + + + = − t t t t t f t x r V r r ε ρ      (7) 
This equation gives us a relationship between asset returns, the risk associated 
with each asset, the correlation structure between each pair of assets, the 
  5coefficient of relative risk aversion and the portfolio weight attributed to each 
asset.  
 
III.  Econometric Model and data 
The model 
A key feature of Eq. (7) is that we require an estimate of the conditional 
variance of asset returns. There is now ample evidence that this matrix is time 
varying (Bollerslev et al., 1988; Clare et al., 1998 among others). The 
development of the family of (G)ARCH models (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986) 
has made it possible to allow the covariance matrix to be continuously changing. 
They also capture other features of asset returns such as thick tails and volatility 
clustering. As our focus is on portfolio diversification, it’s necessary to adopt a 
multivariate GARCH specification. A well-documented problem of estimating 
these models lies in the vast number of potential parameters to be estimated 
simultaneously.
2 A recent advance due to Engle (2002) combines the parsimony 
of earlier specifications with a model sufficiently flexible to incorporate time-
varying conditional correlations. For an n-vector of asset returns, the model 
requires the estimation of n variances but it is assumed that the time variation of 
the covariance elements stems from a common source and can be captured by just 
two parameters. Thus the n(n-1)/2 covariance terms can be modelled for the price 
of two additional parameters. This is the technique adopted here. 
We estimate a multivariate GARCH-in-mean model. It is specified as follows: 
.
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  6D is a diagonal matrix of conditional standard deviations, which is generated 
by 
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 Γ is a time-varying correlation matrix with typical element given by 
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where  is the unconditional expectation of the correlation between i and j. 
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The data 
Our goal is to estimate the CRRA from Eq. (8). We use data on asset holdings 
of two classes of Irish mutual funds; aggressively managed and balanced managed 
funds. The asset holdings for both funds are monthly averages of all the 
investment firms operating in this market. Average behaviour is taken to be more 
indicative of market behaviour. Approximately 20 and 50 funds operate in the 
aggressively and balanced managed categories respectively
3. This data is obtained 
from Moneymate and we also rely on their fund classifications. Moneymate 
categorise aggressively managed funds as those with a mix of equities, fixed 
interest, property, cash and a minimum 65% real asset exposure. Balanced 
managed funds also contain a mix of the above asset types but only require a 40% 
real asset exposure. All funds are monitored on a monthly basis. 
Our sample extends from January 1993 to December 2002. Figures 1 and 2 
plot the asset holdings of aggressively and balanced managed funds respectively. 
As expected, balanced funds have relatively larger holdings in the risk-free asset. 
Consistent with the phenomenon of “home bias” in portfolio composition, Irish 
  7funds disproportionately hold domestic assets. The degree of international 
diversification is less than suggested by financial theory. However, the allocation 
to Irish equity has fallen over time, with an offsetting growth in other Euro zone 
equities. 
Asset holdings are not given by individual assets but by geographical 
breakdown. Therefore we assume that the foreign asset holdings have a beta of 
unity with respect to their regional index. Returns on these assets are computed 
using Datastream constructed indices for each region. We work with rates of 
return in excess of the risk-free rate to prevent volatility in this variable from 
overstating portfolio risk. The risk free rate is proxied by the 1-month money 
market rate. Nominal returns are converted to real returns using monthly inflation 
calculated from the CPI for all items. 
 
IV. Results 
Discussion of results 
The model outlined above was estimated using the Quasi-maximum likelihood 
approach of Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). Table 1 summarises our results. 
We begin with an analysis of the aggressively managed funds. Using the asset 
weights as in Figure 1, our estimate of the CRRA is 1.69. Furthermore, it is quite 
precisely estimated with a standard error of 0.005. Therefore managers of 
aggressively managed funds exhibit a degree of risk aversion that is consistent 
with theoretical models. A similar analysis for the balanced managed funds shows 
these managers are more risk averse. However, the estimate of 3.21, is still at the 
lower end of theoretically acceptable parameters.  Table 2 reports estimates of the 
  8coefficients in the second-order moments. All are statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
However, the reported asset holdings omit a section of the investment 
opportunity set. In particular, the emerging markets of Latin America do not 
feature in the geographical breakdown. We re-estimate Eq. (7) including an index 
of emerging markets with a zero weighting. As expected, we find that the CRRA 
is higher for both categories of fund. In the case of aggressively managed funds 
the estimate grows to 2.42, while for balanced managed funds, it increases to 3.79.  
Aggressively managed funds, which undertake more international 
diversification and hence would appear to be most consistent with theoretical 
models, have coefficients between 1.69 and 2.42. These estimates are in the range 
suggested by Mehra and Prescott (1985) and also within the more restricted range 
of Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Lucas (1994). The estimated coefficients for 
the balanced managed funds are higher and outside of the latter range but are still 
statistically significantly less than 4.  
 
Implications of our results 
We begin by analysing the implications for the utility specification. It is 
common in finance applications to adopt a power utility function as it displays 
many properties that are consistent with investment behaviour
4. All of our 
estimated CRRAs are positive and statistically different from zero and are thus 
consistent with strictly concave, upward sloping utility functions. This function 
also nests another of the great workhorses of finance theory, the log utility 
function. Log utility requires that the CRRA equals one but this hypothesis is 
rejected in all cases. Hence we find no support for the adoption of log utility. 
  9Next, we examine the implications of our results for portfolio selection. In 
particular, we focus on the willingness of fund managers to undertake risky 
investments. We calculate the required probability of winning an actuarially fair 
gamble to induce a risk-averse individual to participate in a lottery. If an agent is 
risk neutral, this probability will simply be 0.5, but a risk averse agent will require 
a premium. The required probability premium is represented by the second term 
on the right hand side of Eq (11):
 5 
ρ π Θ + = Θ
4
1
2
1
) , (W .      ( 1 1 )  
π is the probability of winning the gamble and Θ is the proportion of wealth at 
risk. The other variables are defined as before. It is clear that with odds of 0.5, a 
risk-neutral agent (ρ=0) will participate in the lottery. However, for positive 
values of the CRRA, the probability must be greater than one half to induce the 
agent to gamble. Focussing on aggressively managed funds, we find that for the 
lower estimate of 1.69 managers would be willing to gamble any proportion of the 
portfolio provided the odds of winning are sufficiently stacked in their favour. 
This is presented in Figure 3. We can see that to induce a fund manager to gamble 
50% of their portfolio value, the odds of winning would have to be 0.712, while 
odds of over 0.92 are required before the manager would gamble the entire 
portfolio. Figure 4 conveys a similar story for balanced managed funds. With a 
CRRA of 3.21, the fund manager would require a 90% probability of winning 
before gambling half of the fund. Complete certainty is required to induce the 
manager to gamble 60% of the fund.  
When the emerging market index is included, the CRRA of the aggressively 
managed fund implies that there is now a maximum proportion of the fund that a 
manager is willing to gamble. Without absolute certainty of winning (π=1), the 
  10manager will never gamble amounts in excess of 80% of the fund value. In 
contrast to the previous case, the agent requires 80% chance of winning before 
gambling 50% of the portfolio. With a CRRA of 3.78 for the balanced managed 
fund, a 97.3% probability of winning is required before the manager would 
gamble half of the fund, while only complete certainty would induce the manager 
to gamble 52% of the fund. Figures 5 and 6 present these scenarios.  
 
V. Conclusions 
We focus exclusively on the estimation of the CRRA. Even using a simple 
mean-variance framework, we obtain estimates of the CRRA that are consistent 
with theoretically acceptable values. The innovations in our approach are that we 
cover the entire range of assets in a typical portfolio; secondly we use actual 
portfolio holdings as opposed to those implied by the CAPM; and thirdly we 
capture the continuously changing nature of financial markets through the DCC 
multivariate GARCH model (Engle, 2002). This technique allows us to model the 
time-varying conditional covariance matrix required by our framework.  
  We use data on two categories of funds; aggressively and balanced managed. 
Aggressively managed funds are more internationally diversified and hence have 
lower levels of risk aversion. The CRRA exhibited by these fund managers lies 
between 1.69 and 2.42. Compared to previous studies in the finance literature, our 
estimates are small and nearer to the magnitudes suggested by theory and often 
used in model calibration. However, we can reject the hypothesis that CRRA is 1 
and hence find no evidence to support the use of log utility. For the balanced 
managed funds, CRRA is in the range 3.21 – 3.78. These are still relatively low 
and lie close to the generally accepted range of values. 
  11  We investigate the implications of our estimates for the behaviour of a 
representative fund manager. We compute the probability of success required by 
such an agent to participate in an actuarially fair gamble. In many cases, complete 
certainty is required to induce managers into large bets on the value of their funds. 
 
Endnotes 
1 This framework is compatible with any utility function as long as returns are multivariate 
normally distributed. 
2 Bollerslev et al. (1994) provide an excellent review of this topic along with a number of 
parsimonious parameterisations used in the literature. 
3 Further details on the funds are available from the author. 
 
4 For example, Cass and Stiglitz (1970) show that fund managers offering an identical portfolio to 
clients with different initial wealth is only consistent with utility functions that exhibit constant 
relative (or absolute) risk aversion. 
5 For a full derivation of this equation, see Danthine and Donaldson (2002), pp 44-46. 
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  15Table 1. Summary of results 
 Estimated  CRRA 
Aggressively Managed Funds  1.69 (0.00) 
Aggressively Managed (inc. Emerging markets)  2.42 (0.00) 
Balanced Managed Funds  3.21 (0.00) 
Balanced Managed (inc. Emerging markets)  3.78 (0.00) 
*Numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
  16Table 2: Estimated parameters of the time-varying covariance matrix. 
Aggressively Aggressively*  Balanced  Balanced* 
V11  0.003 (0.00)  0.002 (0.00)  0.002 (0.00)  0.003 (0.00) 
V22  0.002 (0.00)  0.002 (0.00)  0.002 (0.00)  0.002 (0.00) 
V33  0.003 (0.00)  0.003 (0.00)  0.003 (0.00)  0.003 (0.00) 
V44  0.001 (0.00)  0.001 (0.00)  0.001 (0.00)  0.001 (0.00) 
V55  0.003 (0.00)  0.004 (0.00)  0.005 (0.00)  0.005 (0.00) 
V66  0.0005 (0.00)  0.0003 (0.00)  0.0002 (0.00)  0.0003 (0.00) 
V77  -  0.003 (0.00)  -  0.003 (0.00) 
A11  0.067 (0.00)  -0.069 (0.00)  0.026 (0.00)  -0.049 (0.00) 
A22  -0.004 (0.53)  0.009 (0.00)  0.054 (0.00)  0.095 (0.00) 
A33  -0.024 (0.00)  -0.023 (0.00)  0.059 (0.00)  0.037 (0.00) 
A44  0.376 (0.00)  0.303 (0.00)  0.303 (0.00)  0.258 (0.00) 
A55  0.260 (0.00)  0.016 (0.00)  0.128 (0.00)  -0.003 (0.00) 
A66  -0.279 (0.00)  0.046 (0.00)  0.080 (0.00)  0.095 (0.00) 
A77  -  0.039 (0.00)  -  -0.014 (0.00) 
B11  0.079 (0.00)  0.248 (0.00)  -0.039 (0.00)  0.114 (0.00) 
B22  0.039 (0.00)  0.091 (0.00)  0.271 (0.00)  0.077 (0.00) 
B33  -0.053 (0.00)  0.001 (0.02)  -0.071 (0.00)  -0.015 (0.00) 
B44  0.222 (0.00)  0.298 (0.00)  0.087 (0.00)  0.314 (0.00) 
B55  0.006 (0.24)  0.007 (0.00)  0.039 (0.00)  -0.060 (0.00) 
B66  -0.055 (0.00)  0.017 (0.00)  0.087 (0.00)  0.062 (0.00) 
B77  -  0.005 (0.00)  -  -0.010 (0.00) 
α  0.022 (0.018)  0.067 (0.00)  0.039 (0.00)  0.071 (0.00) 
β  0.064 (0.00)  0.484 (0.00)  0.799 (0.00)  0.528 (0.00) 
Numbers in parentheses are p-values. Starred columns refer to portfolios 
including the emerging market index. 
  17Figure 1: Geographical breakdown of Aggressively Managed Funds 
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Figure 2: Geographical breakdown of Balanced Managed Funds
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Figure 3: Odds required by Aggressive Funds Manager to participate in actuarially 
fair gamble
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Figure 4: Odds required by Balanced Funds Manager to participate in actuarially fair 
gamble
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  21Figure 5: Odds required by Aggressive Funds (Inc. Emerging Markets) Manager to 
participate in actuarially fair gamble
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  22Figure 6: Odds required by Balanced Funds (Inc. Emerging Markets) Manager to 
participate in actuarially fair gamble
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